Abstract This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.
of instrumental reciprocity arises naturally in dynamic settings. In repeated games, an equilibrium strategy may specify that "bad" actions are punished and "good" actions are rewarded. Familiar arguments demonstrate how this behavior can support repeatedgame equilibria that provide efficient average payoffs. There is also evidence that some reciprocity is intrinsic. People have an intrinsic preference for reciprocity if they are willing to sacrifice their own material payoff in order to increase the payoff of a kind opponent or decrease the payoff of an unkind opponent. 1 This paper adds to a small theoretical literature on intrinsic reciprocity by identifying a property that connects the weight one player's preferences place on the utility of another player to the "niceness" of the other player's strategy. Geanakoplos et al. (1989) , Rabin (1993) , and Segal and Sobel (2007) present ways to model intrinsic reciprocity in games. These papers extend standard game theory in a way that permits preferences of one player to depend on the intentions of other players. Each strategy profile in a game determines an outcome. Assume that player i has (decision-theoretic) preferences over outcomes that can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u, and that preferences over strategy profiles s are represented by the expected value of the utility u obtained from the possible outcomes of s. These material utility functions are the payoffs of standard game theory. A tractable way to model intrinsic reciprocity is to assume, in addition, that players have strategic preferences over their own strategy set and that these preferences depend on the strategic context (or expected play of the game) so that, in particular, they need not agree with preferences over outcomes. Segal and Sobel (2007) investigate this model and provide conditions under which player i's preferences over his set of mixed strategies (with representative element σ i ) conditional on a context on expected pattern of play (described by the mixed-strategy profile σ * ) is represented by a function V i (·) that can be written as:
When representation (1) holds, we say that player i has preferences for reciprocity. Equation (1) states that instead of evaluating strategies using the utility function u i (·), player i's utility in a game is a weighted average of the decision theoretic utility of all of the players in the game. The weights a j i,σ * depend on the anticipated play of the game (σ * ). One implication of the representation is that player i can positively weight the utility of his opponents in some contexts, and negatively weight it in others. That is, depending on the strategic context, an individual can exhibit altruism (utility is increasing in opponent's material payoff) or spite (utility is decreasing in the opponent's material payoff). Segal and Sobel (2007) develop this theory, provide a representation theorem, and discuss equilibrium in games with preferences for reciprocity.
This paper connects the weights in equation (1) to the perceived kindness of opponents' strategies. Intuitively, one would expect that player i would increase the weight he puts on j's material payoff when i is pleased with j's behavior. If j behaves nicely (for example, by making a voluntary contribution to a public good or offering a fair division in a bargaining game), then i might be willing to sacrifice material welfare to make player j better off. That is, i may repay kindness with kindness. At the same time, i may be willing to sacrifice material utility to harm j when j is nasty. The aim of this paper is to identify the connection between nice behavior and reciprocity. We offer a condition under which it follows that nicer behavior by player j will lead player i to put a higher weight on j's utility. In Sect. 2 we assume that player i has preferences over strategy profiles, which describe his view of their 'niceness.' We then provide conditions on these preferences under which
This result captures the idea that a player is more likely to be kind to an opponent who treats him nicely. In order to prove the result, we introduce a reciprocal altruism assumption that makes precise the connection between (2) and the niceness order. Charness and Rabin (2002) , Rabin (1993) , and Segal and Sobel (2007) define preferences over strategies in strategic-form models of reciprocity. 2 Section 3 discusses the niceness orders that are implicit in the papers of Rabin (1993) and Segal and Sobel (2007) . 3 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk (2006) present models of reciprocity for extensive-form games. In their model, the weight a i,· changes with the play of the game. A generalization of our approach to extensive-form games would appear to require the definition of niceness preferences conditional on all histories and is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Reciprocal altruism
Let X i be the space of outcomes to player i, i = 1, . 4 Given a game, player i has a complete and transitive preference relation over i . These preferences depend of course on σ −i , the strategies of other players, and possibly also on i's interpretation of these strategies or the "context" in which the game is being played. We assume that the context is summarized by a mixed strategy profile σ * , which we interpret as a description of the conventional way in which the game is played. 5 It is within this context that players rank their available strategies. Formally, given σ * = (σ * i , σ * −i ), player i has preferences i,σ * over i . The statement σ i i,σ * σ i says the following. Given the context σ * , player i would prefer to play σ i rather than σ i . Segal and Sobel (2007) give conditions under which i,σ * can be represented by (1). 6 We assume that these conditions hold and, when they do, say that the players have reciprocity preferences. In this section we relate the relative size of the weight a j i,σ * and the niceness of player j's strategy. When there are more than two players, it becomes harder to interpret preferences over opponents' strategies. For example, it is not clear how player i should evaluate player j's utility when player j is nice to k but mean to . We avoid these issues by concentrating on two-player games. Remark 1 describes one way to extend our results to games with more than two players.
We assume that i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j. When there are only two players the weight player i gives to the utility of player j determines the representation of i's utility function over strategies. For simplicity, we drop the j superscript and denote this weight by a i,σ * . 7 To describe player i's attitudes towards player j's behavior we assume that player i has preferences over player j's strategies. Intuitively, i will prefer one strategy profile to another if in the first player j is behaving in a way that i views as "nicer". Different possible attitudes are possible, and we discuss in detail some possibilities below. Leaving room for the most general approach, we assume that this ranking compares pairs of joint strategies. Formally,
is defined over i × j . (The superscript opp stands for "opponent.") The interpretation of the statement "σ 1 opp i σ 2 " is that player i considers j to be nicer to him when she is using σ 1 j in response to σ 1 i than when she is using σ 2 j in response to σ 2 i . (Of course, this definition does not preclude the possibility that the ranking by i of j's behavior is independent of i's choice of strategy.) In this section we analyze the connection between these preferences and the weight a i,σ * player i gives to j's utility. We provide conditions that enable us to say when the weight player i puts on player j's utility is an increasing function of the niceness of player j's behavior. That is, we are interested in conditions on preferences that guarantee:
Our main definition captures the intuition behind the idea that players are willing to reward nice behavior and to punish mean behavior. In what follows, we simplify notation by writing
5 Alternatively, for each i, σ * −i represents player i's beliefs about how his opponents play the game. 6 Naturally, since the representation theorem in Segal and Sobel (2007) is weaker than the standard case, the conditions are weaker that the ones used in standard game theory. Loosely, standard game theory requires that preferences over outcomes determine preferences over strategies for all contexts. Segal and Sobel assume instead that preferences over outcomes determine preferences over strategies only when in contexts where one's strategy choice does not change the material payoffs of all other players. 7 Even though we conduct our analysis from the perspective of player i, we do not drop the subscript i in order to emphasis that different players will put different weights on the other player's utility from outcomes.
Definition 1
The preferences i,σ represent reciprocal altruism if whenever
Furthermore, if either the preference in Condition 1 or the inequality in Condition 3 is strict, then it follows that
The definition says that if "things are essentially equal," then when player j plays a nicer strategy, reciprocally altruistic player i will prefer strategies that lead to larger selfish payoffs to player j. In this way, the definition formalizes the notion that player i repays kindness with kindness. Observe however that so far we did not put any restrictions on the relation opp i , that is, we did not define the meaning of "player j plays a nicer strategy."
The definition appears complicated, so it deserves more discussion. Reciprocal altruism uses information about how player i ranks his own strategies in one context (σ ) to draw a conclusion about his ranking in another context (σ ). In the first context (σ ), player i prefers σ i to σ i . There is no reason for player i's preferences over strategies to be preserved in the second context. When Conditions 2 and 3 hold, however, there is a sense in which the relationship between σ i to σ i when σ is expected is comparable to the relationship betweenσ i andσ i whenσ is expected: Compared to going from σ to σ , going fromσ toσ leads to the same change in utility from payoffs for player j and an increase in the change in utility from payoffs for player i. Condition 4 states that player i thinks that player j is nicer is the second context (σ ) than in the first (σ ). Under these conditions the definition states that player i is reciprocally altruistic if he responds to j's nicer behavior by strengthening his preferences (preferringσ i tō σ i ) whenσ leads to higher utility (over outcomes) for j thanσ . When σ andσ are equally nice, then the reciprocally altruistic preferences of player i are not reversed when going from the original comparison (σ to σ ) to the comparable comparison (σ toσ ).
One can check that in standard game theory when player i's preferences over strategies satisfy σ i i,σ σ i iff u i (σ ) u i (σ ), they represent reciprocal altruism provided that player i views all of j's strategies as equally nice (σ ∼ opp iσ for allσ ). To see this, note that the first condition implies u i (σ ) u i (σ ). The third condition then implies u i (σ ) u i (σ ), hence, the conclusion of the definition must hold.
We argue that the condition must hold whenever equation (3) holds. That is, preferences must satisfies the reciprocal altruism assumption whenever weights a i,σ are increasing in the niceness of σ . Later in the section we provide conditions under which reciprocal altruism is in fact necessary and sufficient for equation (3).
Assume that Conditions 1, 2, and 3 of the axiom hold and one can represent player i's preferences over strategies in the form u i (σ ) + a i,σ u j (σ ). The first condition implies that
which, when combined with the second and third conditions, yields
It follows thatσ
where the last inequality follows by inequality (4). If either Condition 1 holds with strict preference or Condition 3 holds with a strict inequality, then the inequality in (4) is strict and (5) becomes
The next result is a straightforward consequence of inequalities (5) and (6).
Theorem 1 If players have reciprocity preferences and a i,σ a i,σ iffσ opp i
σ , then preferences represent reciprocal altruism.
Theorem 1 states that if the weight that player i places on player j's utility is an increasing function of the niceness of player j's behavior, then reciprocal altruism must hold. The main result of this section is a converse to this result, that is, it states conditions under which reciprocal altruism implies that the weight a i,σ * is increasing in the niceness of player j's strategy. Because of the structure of our model, this statement cannot be globally true, as there are situations where the weights a i,σ * are not uniquely defined (see Example 1 below).
There are two situations in which a i,σ * is uniquely determined by player i's preferences over strategies and choices of the utility functions u i and u j . When either of these situations hold, then we show in Theorem 2(1) below that a i,σ * is necessarily increasing in the niceness of player j's strategy. They are 1. The set of possible utility allocations generated by player i's activity given σ * j ,
, has a nonempty interior. 2. The set A i (σ * j ) has an empty interior, but is a non-trivial indifference set of the preferences i,σ * .
There are two cases in which the first of these conditions is not satisfied. Either for all σ j ∈ j , A i (σ j ) has an empty interior, in which case we say that the game is poor for player i, or some, but not all of sets A i (σ j ) have an empty interior, in which case we say that σ j is poor. Strategies that are not poor are rich.
All games where n i = 2 are poor for player i, and as we show in Appendix A, this is, to a certain extent, the only case in which games are poor. We also show there that if a game is not poor, then the set of its poor strategies is closed and of measure zero. σ .
In the second case, the actual choice of a i,σ may depend onσ and not only on σ , and it may differ when the poor strategy σ is compared toσ or toσ . The following example shows that this problem is unavoidable. Suppose further that for every ε > 0, player i prefers playing s 2 i to s 1 i , 8 and that he considers σ j (ε)
Observe that for every ε > 0, the lotteries person i obtains from these two pure strategies cannot be compared by first order stochastic dominance, while the lottery player j receives from s 2 i dominates the lottery she receives from s 1 i . Moreover, when ε → 0, all lotteries converge to a sure gain of 1. 9 For example, i considers j's behavior to be protective, and the lower the value of ε, the higher is the lowest outcome which player i may receive.
Fig. 1 Example 2
Obviously, it is impossible to assign a i,σ j (0) a unique value such that for every ε > 0, 0)) is the point (1, 1), and any value of a i,σ j (0) will be consistent with reciprocity utility functions. (See Fig. 1 where the upper end points of each of the sets A i (σ j (ε)) represent the utility allocations that follow from i's optimal behavior given j plays ε = 0.8, 0.5, 0.35, 0.) Remark 1 We mentioned before that interpretation of preferences over opponents' strategies becomes harder when there are more than two players. The following is a possible extension of the definition of reciprocal altruism to the case of more than two players. In all strategy profiles, σ k are fixed for all k = i, j. Definition 3 * The preferences i,σ represent I -person reciprocal altruism if whenever
Furthermore, if either the preference in Condition 1 or the inequality in Condition 3 is strict then It follows that
In words, the reciprocal altruism definition is applied to any two players provided the acts of player i do not affect the utility of all other players (except for his own utility and that of player j). While Theorem 1 and Theorem 2(1) extend to I -player games with this definition, we cannot prove Theorem 2(2).
Examples
In this section we discuss the niceness preferences that is implicit in two treatments of reciprocal preferences. Our results enable us to look at a specific functional form for preferences over strategies and determine the implicit niceness preference relationship.
The functional form Rabin uses in the body of his manuscript is equivalent to the conditional preference relationship over strategies given by equation (1).
In order to define the weight, a i,σ * , Rabin lets u h i (σ * i ) be the highest (material) payoff available to player i if player i chooses σ * i . That is, 
We refer the reader to Rabin's article for a motivation for these preferences. 10 The results of Sect. 2 link the niceness of a strategy profile σ * to the magnitude of a i,σ * . Note that in this example, player i's niceness ranking depends on σ * i , the strategy that he is expected to play. Segal and Sobel (2007) argue that Rabin's representation cannot explain observed behavior in ultimatum bargaining games and propose:
where F G is a fair outcome of the game G and λ is a normalization factor. If equation (8) defines the weights, then player i views a strategy profile as nicer if it enables i to obtain a higher material payoff. In this case, a player's "niceness" preferences depend only on the strategy choice of the opponent.
Appendix A: Rich and poor strategies
If Player i has reciprocity preferences, then a i,σ * is uniquely determined by u i and u j provided that there exist σ , σ ∈ such that
Under these conditions, one has
and so
We now provide conditions under which (9) must hold.
Definition 4 A game is called poor (for player i) if all the n i points
are on the same line in 2n j . A game that is not poor is rich.
In particular, all games where player i has at most two pure strategies are poor for player i. Moreover, if the game is poor for player i, then there are two pure strategies s i 1 and s i 2 such that for all k, the vector (u(
, and the game is essentially a 2 × n j game. A strategy σ j is rich (for player i) if all the n i points (u(
are not on the same line in 2 . By Segal and Sobel (2007, Theorem 1) , if σ j is rich, then a i,σ is uniquely determined. Strategies that are not rich are poor. The game G is poor for player i iff σ j is poor for player i for all σ j ∈ j . 11 A rich game will generally have poor strategies, but the next result shows that they are rare. 
If all the n i points are the same (case 1 above), then for k = 2, . . . , n i the following linear (in σ 1 j , . . . , σ n j j ) equations are satisfied: i , σ j ). Since all strategies σ j are poor, one can show that k 1 and k 2 cannot depend on σ j , hence the game G is poor.
Since G is rich for player i, the above equations do not have all of j as a solution, hence the set of solutions is of measure zero (in the (n i − 1)-dimensional simplex). The set of solutions to either set of equations is obviously closed. 
and u(σ ) ∈ B(u(σ ), ε) (see Fig. 2 ). In words, when a i,σ is well defined and hence L = a i,σ , given that player j is responding with σ j to player i playing σ i (hence the use of a i,σ = a i,(σ i ,σ j ) ), player i is indifferent between playing σ i and playing σ i . When a i,σ is not well defined, u(σ ) is another point in A i (σ j ) (satisfying (12)). Since B(u(σ ), ε) ∈ Int A i (σ j ) and u(σ ) ∈ B(u(σ ), ε), it follows that there exists σ i ∈ j such that
Eqs. (13) and (14) imply that
(geometrically, the line through u(σ ) and u(σ ) is parallel to the line through u(σ ) and u(σ )). As A i (σ j ) has a nonempty interior, a i,σ is uniquely determined. Furthermore, it follows from Eq. (15) that
Since u j (σ ) > u j (σ ), it follows that u j (σ ) > u j (σ ), and we obtain from (16) that
Case Ia: L = a i,σ . We have (from Eq. (13)) that σ i ∼ i,σ σ i and so by Eq. (14), the first three conditions in the definition of reciprocal altruism hold.
